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John Pollock (1940-2009) was an inﬂuential American philosopher who made important contributions to
various ﬁelds, including epistemology and cognitive science. In the last 25 years of his life he also con-
tributed to the computational study of defeasible reasoning and practical cognition in artiﬁcial intelligence.
He developed one of the ﬁrst formal systems for argumentation-based inference and he put many issues
on the research agenda that are still relevant for the argumentation community today. This paper presents
an appreciation of Pollock’s work on defeasible reasoning and its relevance for the computational study of
argument. In our opinion, Pollock deserves to be remembered as one of the founding fathers of the ﬁeld of
computational argument while, moreover, his work contains important lessons for current research in this
ﬁeld, reminding us of the richness of its object of study.
1. Introduction
John Pollock (1940-2009) was an inﬂuential American philosopher who made important
contributionstovariousﬁelds,includingepistemologyandcognitivescience.Inthelast25
years of his life he also contributed to artiﬁcial intelligence, ﬁrst to the study of defeasible
reasoning and then to the study of decision-theoretic planning and practical cognition.
In his work on defeasible reasoning Pollock developed one of the ﬁrst formal systems
for argumentation-based inference and he put many issues on the research agenda that
are still relevant for our community today. This paper reviews the relevance of Pollock’s
work on defeasible reasoning for the computational study of argumentation.1 His later
work on rational decision making and practical cognition (including decision-theoretic
planning) will not be discussed since, unlike his work on defeasible reasoning, it is not
argumentation-based.
There are many reasons to remember and acknowledge Pollock’s work in this journal.
Many important topics in our ﬁeld were ﬁrst studied by Pollock, or ﬁrst studied in detail,
such as argument structure, the nature of defeasible reasons, the interplay between de-
ductive and defeasible reasons, rebutting versus undercutting defeat, argument strength,
argument labelings, self-defeat, and resource-bounded argumentation. Another reason to
remember Pollock is that, these days, several lessons to be learned from his work tend
to be forgotten, and several important issues that he studied tend to be neglected for the
sake of technical simplicity but at the expense of cognitive adequacy—especially in two
current research strands: namely, work on abstract argumentation, and work on classical
and deductive argumentation. This is particularly unfortunate since a central virtue of an
argumentation approach is its grounding in natural and intuitive concepts; if conceptual
1We will conﬁne ourselves to argumentation-based inference, since Pollock never studied argumentation-based dialogue.
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naturalness is sacriﬁced for technical simplicity, then our ﬁeld is in danger of becoming
sterile and inward looking and failing to realize its high potential. A secondary aim of
this paper, therefore, is to use Pollock’s legacy to remind the research community of the
richness of its object of study.
A concise quote that summarizes Pollock’s view on defeasible reasoning is this:
Defeasible reasoning is, a fortiori, reasoning. Reasoning proceeds by constructing argu-
ments, where reasons provide the atomic links in arguments. Conclusive reasons logically
entail their conclusions. Defeasibility arises from the fact that not all reasons are conclu-
sive. Those that are not are prima facie reasons. Prima facie reasons create a presumption in
favour of their conclusion, but it is defeasible. (Pollock 1995, p. 85)
Pollock thus depicts arguments as inference trees, where the nodes are statements, with
the leaf nodes being premises, and the links are applications of ‘reasons’. He thus re-
garded reasons as inference rules, but he did not identify inference rules with deductive
inference rules alone. Pollock strongly emphasized the importance of defeasible reasons
in argumentation.1 He was quite insistent that defeasible reasoning is not just some ex-
otic, exceptional, add-on to deductive reasoning—or, as is sometimes thought in computer
science, only a heuristic matter—but is, instead, an essential ingredient of our cognitive
life:
It is supposed that defeasible reasoning is less secure than normal reasoning, and should be
countenanced only for the sake of computational efﬁciency. Its use is not just a matter of
computational efﬁciency. It is logically impossible to reason successfully about the world
around us using only deductive reasoning. All interesting reasoning outside mathematics
involves defeasible steps. (Pollock 1995, p.41)
::: we cannot get around in the world just reasoning deductively from our prior beliefs to-
gether with new perceptual input. This is obvious when we look at the varieties of reasoning
we actually employ. We tend to trust perception, assuming that things are the way they ap-
pear to us, even though we know that sometimes they are not. And we tend to assume that
facts we have learned perceptually will remain true, as least for a while, when we are no
longer perceiving them, but of course, they might not. And, importantly, we combine our
individual observations inductively to form beliefs about both statistical and exceptionless
generalizations. None of this reasoning is deductively valid. (Pollock 2009, p. 173)
Starting in the 1980’s, Pollock set out to formalize this view of defeasible reasoning and
then to implement it in an automated reasoner that he baptized as OSCAR. Besides giving
a general account of the structure of arguments and of the interplay between deductive and
defeasible inferences, he also formalized particular defeasible reasons that he found im-
portant in human cognition. In particular, he formalized reasons for perception, memory,
induction, the statistical syllogism, and temporal persistence, as well as so-called ‘under-
cutting’ defeaters for these reasons. Pollock extensively studied the problem of identify-
ing the justiﬁed beliefs generated by a set of arguments and their defeat relations, and
his various solutions to this problem predated much current work on argumentation-based
semantics.
In what follows, we ﬁrst give a historic sketch of Pollock’s work and its relation with
other work in philosophy and artiﬁcial intelligence. We then review the essentials of his
formal models, after which we critically examine some of the current work on deduc-
tive argumentation in light of Pollock’s work. We end with with some observations on
Pollock’s way of working and thinking and a summary of his contributions to our ﬁeld.
1Pollock varied in his terminology: in his earlier papers he exclusively spoke of “conclusive” and “prima facie” reasons,
while later he also referred to “deductive” and “defeasible” reasons (and sometimes to “inference rules” instead of “rea-
sons”). We will speak of deductive and defeasible reasons/inference rules. By ‘deductive argumentation’ we mean argumen-
tation where all arguments are built with deductive inference rules, and by ‘classical argumentation’ we mean the special
case of deductive argumentation where the inference inference rules consist of all valid propositional or ﬁrst-order inference
rules.January 3, 2012 15:17 Argument & Computation obituary6
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2. A historic sketch
In modern philosophy, the study of defeasibility and defeat originated in legal philosophy,
in the work of Hart (1949), who pointed out, ﬁrst, how otherwise binding contracts might
be compromised by the presence of defeating conditions, and later emphasized the defea-
sible nature of legal rules in general. The concept of defeasibility—echoing Ross’s notion
of prima facie rules (Ross 1930), as well as some of Wittgenstein’s ideas—was originally
studied solely within legal philosophy, practical reasoning, and ethics. It made the jump
from ethics to epistemology in the work of Chisholm (1957), who appealed to the idea in
both ﬁelds, and later in the work of Pollock, beginning with his (1970) and developed in
a number of articles leading up to his (1974) and beyond.
Pollock’s work on argumentation originated as an attempt to make formal sense of the
intuitive notion of defeasible reasoning that seemed to be at work in these papers and
books. In fact, the task had been attempted before. There is an early paper by Chisholm
(1974), a heroic effort whose failure is no surprise given the limited tools available at the
time. Still, in spite of the blossoming of philosophical logic in the 1960’s and 1970’s,
the logical study of defeasible reasoning had received almost no attention at all. It is fair
to say that Pollock, working in isolation, was the ﬁrst philosopher working in the ﬁeld
of philosophy, as opposed to computer science, to outline an adequate framework for
defeasible reasoning
Pollock’s initial paper on the topic was his classic (1987). By the time that paper was
published, several researchers in artiﬁcial intelligence had independently begun to ex-
plore an argument-based approach to defeasible, or nonmonotonic, reasoning. This early
research includes the work of Touretzky (1986) on inheritance systems, later developed
along with several collaborators (Horty et al. 1987, 1990, Touretzky et al. 1987), as well
as the work of Nute (1988) and Loui (1987). And of course, by the late 1980’s, the ﬁeld
of nonmonotonic reasoning more generally, of which the argument-based approach was
only a part, had been recognized as an important subﬁeld of artiﬁcial intelligence. Al-
though Pollock’s ideas originated in his effort to understand defeasible reasoning in a
philosophical context, it was the formation, within artiﬁcial intelligence, of a community
of researchers focused on nonmonotonic reasoning that led to the publication of these
ideas. Concerning his 1987 paper, Pollock later wrote that he ﬁrst developed the idea in
1979, but that he did not initially publish it because, as he says, “being ignorant of AI,
I did not think anyone would be interested.” (Pollock 2007b, p. 469). It is interesting to
note that, if Pollock had published this idea when it ﬁrst occurred to him, the result would
have been not only the ﬁrst argument-based theory of defeasible reasoning, but one of the
ﬁrst systems of any kind for nonmonotonic reasoning.
In any case, the paper was eventually published, and then several successive papers
or books on argumentation and defeasibility (Pollock 1992, 1994, 1995, 2002, 2007a,b,
2009, 2010) and Pollock began a fruitful period of interaction with researchers in non-
monotonic reasoning, artiﬁcial intelligence more generally, and of course, argumentation.
Although Pollock learned much from these communities, they also learned much from
him. Research in nonmonotonic reasoning, at the time, was motivated by a set of con-
cerns from planning, logic programming, knowledge representation, and database theory.
Pollock brought a fresh set of concerns, from his earlier work in traditional epistemology,
along with some fresh ideas. The most important of these may have been the distinc-
tion, introduced by Pollock in (1970), between two separate kinds of defeat: rebutting
and undercutting. In fact, something like this distinction had emerged independently in
the ﬁeld of knowledge representation, in the “uncancel” links from Fahlman’s (1979)
semantic networks; but the idea quickly evaporated in the formal treatments of these net-
works, for reasons of theoretical simplicity. It was Pollock’s insistence on the importance
of this distinction, for reasons of descriptive adequacy, that reintroduced it into the ﬁeldsJanuary 3, 2012 15:17 Argument & Computation obituary6
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of nonmonotonic reasoning and argumentation, where it has remained vitally important,
for example, in representation problems involving legal reasoning. Indeed, Pollock’s idea
of an undercutting defeater is closely related to the notion of an exclusionary reason, ﬁrst
introduced by Raz (1975), who himself cites Pollock; for more recent work linking the
two ideas, see Horty (2012).
3. A closer look at Pollock’s work on defeasible reasoning
Let us now take a closer look at Pollock’s approach to modeling defeasible reasoning.
His ﬁrst paper with a formal system for argumentation-based defeasible reasoning was
his (1987) but he published several later versions, notably his (1992, 1994, 1995, 2002,
2009), largely because he changed his mind on several design issues, especially on the
characterization of defeasible inference, and on the notion of argument strength.
3.1. Constant features
There are several constant features in Pollock’s formalization of defeasible reasoning.
Reasoning proceeds from a knowledge base of classical-logic formulas by chaining rea-
sons into inference trees, where all reasons are either deductive or defeasible. Only ap-
plications of defeasible reasons can be defeated, and there are two kinds of defeaters:
rebutting defeaters attack the conclusion of a defeasible inference by favoring a conﬂict-
ing conclusion, while undercutting defeaters attack the defeasible inference itself, with-
out favoring a conﬂicting conclusion. The concept of undercutting can be illustrated with
Pollock’s own favorite example: if the object looks red, that is a reason for concluding,
defeasibly, that the object is red; but the presence of red illumination interrupts the reason
relation without suggesting any conﬂicting conclusion. In later iterations of Pollock’s sys-
tems, inferences and conclusions have probabilistic strengths, and these strengths partly
determine defeat, in that an attempted defeater only succeeds if it is not weaker than its
target.
Pollock’s technical presentation of his system differs with his different publications,
but the basic ideas can be sketched as follows. Technically, Pollock considers sequences
of lines from an argument (in later work, he speaks of nodes from an inference graph).
Each line from an argument is a tuple (';r;l;s), where ' is a proposition, r is the reason
applied to infer ' (where this reason can also be that ' is taken from the knowledge
base), l is the set of preceding lines from which ' is inferred, and s is the line’s strength.
A sequence of such lines is a (linear) argument if each line is such that its proposition
is either inferred from earlier lines or taken from the knowledge base. Thus Pollock’s
notion of an argument is similar to the familiar notion of a deduction. In a suppositional
argument, lines also have a set of suppositions; these can be added to each line and can
also be used to infer conclusions; their retraction gives rise to conditional conclusions,
just as in natural deduction. In this paper we will only consider linear arguments.
The defeat relation ﬁrst among argument lines and them among arguments can then be
deﬁned as follows:
Definition 3.1: [Defeat among argument lines and arguments]
(1) An argument line (';r;l;s) defeats an argument line ('0;r0;l0;s0) iff
a) r0 is a defeasible rule, and
b) s  s0, and
c) ' = :'0 or ' = :r0 (here :r is shorthand for saying that the antecedents
of rule r do not support its consequent).
(2) An argument A defeats an argument B iff a line of A defeats a line of B.January 3, 2012 15:17 Argument & Computation obituary6
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Considerbywayofexamplethefollowing(informal)versionofthewell-knownTweety
example, with the arguments displayed in tree form (as is well known, each deduction can
be converted into an inference tree, while each inference tree can be converted into sev-
eral deductions, each capturing on order in which a reasoner can construct the tree). The
following ﬁgure contains three (maximal) arguments: two arguments for the conclusions
that Tweety ﬂies, respectively, does not ﬂy, and an argument denying that the reason used
to infer the ﬁrst of these conclusions applies.
Figure 1. An example
This ﬁgure assumes four defeasible inference rules, informally paraphrased as follows:
r1: That an object looks like having property P is a defeasible reason for believing
that the object has property P
r2: That n=m observed P’s are Q’s (where n=m > 0;5) is a defeasible reason for
believing that most P’s are Q’s
r3: That most P’s are Q’s and x is a P is a defeasible reason for believing that
x is a Q
r4: That an ornithologist says ' about birds is a defeasible reason for believing '
Rule r1 expresses that perceptions yield a defeasible reason for believing that what is per-
ceived to be the case is indeed the case, rule r2 captures enumerative induction, while r3
expresses the statistical syllogism. Rule r4 can be seen as a special case of the argumenta-
tion scheme from expert testimony; cf. Walton (1996) (this is our way of illustrating that
Pollock’s notion of prima reasons is very similar to Walton’s notion of an argumentation
scheme; Pollock would probably have depicted this inference as an application of the sta-
tistical syllogism to the generalization ‘most experts speak the truth about their ﬁeld of
expertise’).
Moreover, the ﬁgure assumes an obvious strict inference rule plus an undercutting de-
feater for r3:January 3, 2012 15:17 Argument & Computation obituary6
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r5: That P’s are a subclass of Q’s and a is a P is a deductive reason for believing
that a is a Q
r6: That x is an R, most R’s are not Q’s and R’s are a subclass of P’s is a
deductive reason for believing :r3
Rule r6 is a special case of Pollock’s “subproperty defeater” of the statistical syllogism,
which says that conﬂicting statistical information about a subclass undercuts the statistical
syllogism for the superclass.
With these inference rules made explicit, the three arguments can be formally repre-
sented as follows (ignoring strength, so that argument lines can be depicted as triples,
rather than 4-tuples):
A:
1: (Tweety looks like a penguin, fact, ;)
2: (Tweety is a penguin, r1, f1g)
3: (Penguins are a subclass of birds), fact, ;)
4: (Tweety is a bird, r5, f2;3g)
5: (9=10 observed birds ﬂy, fact, ;)
6: (Most birds can ﬂy, r2, f5g)
7: (Tweety can ﬂy, r3, f4;6g)
B:
1: (Tweety looks like a penguin, fact, ;)
2: (Tweety is a penguin, r1, f1g)
3: (Penguins are a subclass of birds), fact, ;)
8: (Bob is an ornithologist), fact, ;)
9: (Bob says that most penguins cannot ﬂy), fact, ;)
10: (Most penguins cannot ﬂy, r4, f8;9g)
11: (:r3, r6, f2;3;10g)
C:
1: (Tweety looks like a penguin, fact, ;)
2: (Tweety is a penguin, r1, f1g)
8: (Bob is an ornithologist), fact, ;)
9: (Bob says that most penguins cannot ﬂy), fact, ;)
10: (Most penguins cannot ﬂy, r4, f4;5g)
12: (Tweety cannot ﬂy, r3, f2;10g)
Note that these arguments have several ‘subarguments’, since any sequence of lines of
which all elements are a fact or inferred from previous elements in the sequence is an
argument.1
In Figure 1 deductive, respectively defeasible inferences are visualized with, respec-
tively, solid and dotted lines without arrow heads, while defeat relations are displayed
with arrows. Naming arguments according to their last line, it can be seen that argument
B11 strictly defeats argument A7 since line 11 undercuts line 7, while arguments A7 and
C12 defeat each other since line 7 and 12 rebut each other.
As should be apparent from this example, Pollock’s notion of an argument as a tree or
sequence of inferences is quite natural; its only remarkable features are that arguments
interleave application of deductive and defeasible inference rules and that arguments can
1In systems like the ASPIC framework of Prakken (2010) the notion of a subargument is reﬁned to sequences which in
graph form are trees. For example, according to Pollock (1987) the sequence (1,3) is an argument but not according to
Prakken (2010).January 3, 2012 15:17 Argument & Computation obituary6
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have varying strength. His notion of defeat is also quite natural. First, given that deductive
reasons provide conclusive support for their conclusion, it is natural that their application
cannot be attacked: one cannot at the same time rationally accept the premises and deny
the conclusion of a deductive inference. And second, Pollock’s distinction between rebut-
ting and undercutting defeat, while new when he introduced it in 1970, has meanwhile
proven its value.2
3.2. Semantics
While, throughout his career, Pollock left his notions of argument construction and de-
feat essentially unchanged, he more than once changed the semantics for his system. For
Pollock, a semantics was an account of how the set of constructed arguments, taken to-
gether with their defeat relations, determines what a cognizer should believe. For today’s
students of computational argument, the approach to follow might seem to be obvious:
since Pollock’s system results in a set of arguments together with a binary relation of
defeat, he could simply have appealed to any of Dung (1995)’s semantics of abstract ar-
gumentation frameworks. However, much of Pollock’s work was published before Dung’s
seminal paper, and Pollock never explicitly used Dung’s semantics. Nevertheless, his ﬁrst
two proposals have each been proven to be equivalent to one of Dung’s proposals.
In his initial (1987), after specifying an argument as self-defeating if one of its lines
defeats another of its lines, Pollock deﬁned his semantics by introducing the concepts of
arguments that are in or out at various levels, and then ultimately undefeated, as follows:
Definition 3.2: [Semantics of Pollock (1987)]
(1) All arguments that are not self-defeating arguments are in at level 0.
(2) An argument is in at level n + 1 iff it is not defeated by any argument in at level
n.
(3) An argument is ultimately undefeated iff there is an m such that for every n  m,
the argument is in at level n.
In the example of Figure 1 all displayed arguments are in at level 0. The only arguments
that are not in at level 1 are B7 and C12. Of these, only C12 is in at level 2, since its only
defeater, which is A7, is not in at level 1; Furthermore, all other arguments, including B11,
remain in at all levels, so A7 remains not in at all levels; hence all arguments except A7
are ultimately undefeated.
Dung (1995) proved that, if there are no self-defeating arguments, then Deﬁnition 3.2 is
equivalent to his grounded semantics. More precisely, Dung ﬁrst observed that the ideas
from Deﬁnition 3.2 can be deﬁned in terms of a operator that, for a given set of arguments,
returns the set of arguments undefeated by any argument in that set. Dung then proved
that his “characteristic function” of argumentation frameworks, which for a given set of
arguments returns all arguments all of whose defeaters are themselves defeated by some
argument from that set, can be deﬁned as a double application of this operator. Finally,
Dung proved that Pollock’s own level construction yields the least ﬁxed point of this
characteristic function, leading to what Dung calls the grounded extension.
After his initial semantics, Pollock later (1994, 1995) turned to a labeling-based ap-
proach, which, moreover, does not refer to arguments but instead relies on the notion
of an inference graph: nodes in such a graph correspond to lines of argument and links
represent either reason or defeat relations. An example of such an inference graph is the
previous Figure 1. Despite his new focus on inference graphs, rather than sets of argu-
ments, Pollock continued to present his work as argumentation-based:
2Although some terminological confusion has arisen since others (Amgoud and Cayrol 2002, Besnard and Hunter 2001,
2008, Krause et al. 1995) have used it for attack on a premise instead of on the application of a defeasible inference rule.January 3, 2012 15:17 Argument & Computation obituary6
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The theory of defeasible reasoning adumbrated in this book is an “argument-based” theory,
in the sense that it characterizes defeasible consequence in terms of the interactions between
the inference steps of all possible arguments that an be constructed from a given set input
using a ﬁxed set of defeasible reasons and defeaters. (Pollock 1995, p. 105)
Pollock’s new deﬁnition moves through the idea of a partial defeat status assignment,
which again labels nodes as in or out, to that of a maximal defeat status assignment,
which is as complete a status assignment as possible. Arguments are then characterized as
ultimately undefeated, defeated outright, or provisionally defeated depending upon their
behavior in the various maximal status assignments.
Definition 3.3: [Semantics of Pollock (1994, 1995)]
An assignment  of in and out to a subset of the nodes of an inference graph is a partial
defeat status assignment iff
(1)  assigns in to any initial node;
(2)  assigns in to a non-initial node  iff  assigns in to all immediate ancestors of
 and  assigns out to all nodes defeating ;
(3)  assigns out to a node  iff  either assigns out to an immediate ancestor of  or
assigns in to a node defeating .
A defeat status assignment is a maximal partial defeat status assignment; a node is ulti-
mately undefeated if it is in in all defeat status assignments, defeated outright if it is in in
no defeat status assignments and provisionally defeated otherwise.
In the example of Figure 1 lines 1,3,5,8 and 9 must be assigned in by clause (1). Then
all lines except 7 and 12 must be assigned in by clause (2) since they have no defeaters.
Then line 7 must be assigned out by clause (3), since it is defeated by line 11, which must
be assigned in. Then line 12 must be assigned in by clause (2) since its only defeater must
be assigned out.
Jakobovits (Jakobovits 2000, Jakobovits and Vermeir 1999) proved Deﬁnition 3.3 to
be equivalent to another of Dung’s proposals, the preferred semantics. Indeed, it is easy
to see that the conditions on defeaters in (2) and (3) are the same as the conditions of
preferred labelings in the sense of Caminada (2006). Such labelings label arguments of a
Dung-style abstract argumentation framework as either in, out or undecided, in a way that
satisﬁes the following constraints:
(1) An argument is in if all arguments defeating it are out
(2) An argument is out if it is defeated by an argument that is in
(3) An argument is undecided otherwise.
A labeling is preferred if it minimizes the set of undecided arguments, while it is grounded
if it maximizes this set. Jakobovits’s result indicates that Pollock could also have formu-
lated his new semantics by retaining his old notions of argument and defeat and directly
using the above deﬁnition of preferred labelings. In any case we can say that the idea of
argument labelings was introduced in our ﬁeld by Pollock, although its use in nonmono-
tonic logic ultimately goes back to Doyle (1979)’s justiﬁcation-based truth maintenance
systems.
A main reason why Pollock changed his mind between 1987 and 1994 was to reﬁne
his treatment of self-defeating arguments. While in his (1987) semantics they were all
unable to affect the status of other arguments, Pollock later realized that there are two
kinds of self-defeating arguments, one of which should still be capable of preventing other
arguments from being ultimately undefeated. The ﬁrst kind of self-defeat he considered
results in a situation in which two arguments for contradictory conclusions rebut each
other (see Figure 2; in the examples below we assume for simplicity that all arguments
are of equal strength). Here r1 says that q is a defeasible reason for p while r2 says thatJanuary 3, 2012 15:17 Argument & Computation obituary6
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Figure 2. Parallel selfdefeat
r is a defeasible reason for :p. Given q and r as facts, this results in two arguments
rebutting each other. The contradictory conclusions can then be combined by applying a
strict rule expressing the Ex Falso principle (an inconsistent set of formulas deductively
implies everything) to support any formula. Thus a rebuttal a rebuttal can be constructed
for any other defeasible argument line, such as here line 7. Clearly, such self-defeating
rebuttals should not prevent any other argument from being ultimately undefeated, and
Deﬁnition 3.2 respects this by declaring all self-defeating arguments as not in at level 0,
so that they do not interfere with other arguments.
However, there is a second kind of self-defeating argument, which should be able to
prevent other arguments from being justiﬁed. Consider the following version of the argu-
ment scheme from witness testimony plus an undercutter in case the witness is incredible:
r1: That a witness says ' is a defeasible reason for '
r2: That a witness is incredible is a deductive reason for :r1
Assume as given that Witness John says that he is incredible. Then (again ignoring
strength) we can construct the following argument (on the left of Figure 3:
1: (Witness John says he is incredible, fact, ;)
2: (John is incredible, r1, f1g)
3: (:r1, r2, f2g)
The argument up to line 3 is self-defeating, since line 3 undercuts line 2. Thus, accord-
ing to Deﬁnition 3.2, the argument up to line 3 is at no level in. But then the argument
up to line 2 is ultimately undefeated since its only defeater is at no level in, while yet a
deductive consequence of line 2’s conclusion (the conclusion of line 3) cannot be drawn,
since the argument up to line 3 is not ultimately undefeated. This is strange.1 By contrast,
according to Deﬁnition 3.3, there is a unique maximal status assignment for this example,
in which line 1 is in and both 2 and 3 are undeﬁned. Thus, although both 2 and 3 are de-
feated outright, 3 still retains its ability prevent other argument lines from being ultimately
undefeated, and this is desirable. Suppose witness John also says something completely
unrelated, such as “The suspect hit the victim.” We then also have the following argument
(on the right of Figure 3):
4: (Witness John says that the suspect stabbed the victim, fact), ;)
5: (The suspect hit the victim, r1, f4g)
1Indeed, it violates Caminada and Amgoud (2007)’s rationality postulate of closure of argument extensions under deductive
inference.January 3, 2012 15:17 Argument & Computation obituary6
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Figure 3. Serial selfdefeat
According to Deﬁnition 3.2 line 5 is ultimately undefeated, while yet it is based on a state-
Figure 4. A selfdefeating witness
ment of a witness who says of himself that he is incredible. This seems counterintuitive.
By contrast, according to Deﬁnition 3.3 line 5 is also defeated outright, since its status is
undeﬁned.2
In conclusion, Deﬁnition 3.3 captures that there are two classes of self-defeating ar-
guments, which are both always defeated outright, but one of which still has the power
of preventing other arguments from being ultimately undefeated. This observation also
implies that self-defeating arguments cannot simply be ruled out from consideration by
deﬁnition.
In one of his last publications (2009) Pollock again revised his semantics, motivated by
concerns similar to those of Baroni and Giacomin (2005). He realized that his (1994,1995)
distinction between two types of self-defeat in fact also gave different treatments to odd
and even defeat cycles of arbitrary length, and he regarded that as counterintuitive. Let
us extend the above example by replacing the single self-defeating witness with ﬁrst an
even defeat cycle of two and then an odd defeat cycle of three witnesses (see Figure 5).
2In fact, Caminada (2005) showed that this treatment of self-defeat is not yet optimal. Consider again two rebutting argu-
ments combined with Ex Falso to an argument for any proposition. Pollock thought that always at least one of the rebutting
subarguments would be out so that the Ex Falso argument would also be out. However, Caminada showed that if both re-
butting arguments have self-defeating arguments of the second type as a subargument, then (if there are no other defeaters),
they are are both undeﬁned, so the Ex Falso argument is also undeﬁned and retains its power to prevent other arguments
from being in.January 3, 2012 15:17 Argument & Computation obituary6
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Suppose ﬁrst we have two witnesses Albert and Bob, who say of each other that they are
Figure 5. An even defeat cycle
unreliable, thus undercutting each other. Imagine also that Albert and Donald rebut each
other on the issue whether the suspect hit the victim. We then have two maximal label-
ings: in one lines 3 and 8 are in while 6 and 10 are out, so both 8 and 10 are provisionally
defeated and we can believe neither Bob nor Donald on whether the suspect hit the victim.
However, consider next three witnesses Albert, Bob and Carole, where Albert says that
Bob is unreliable, Bob says that Carole is unreliable and Carole says that Albert is unreli-
able, while Albert and Donald still rebut each other on whether the suspect hit the victim
(Figure 6). Then there is only one maximal labeling, in which line 10 is in while line 8 is
Figure 6. An odd defeat cycle
out (and all of 3,6,13 undecided). We cannot create a labeling in which we believe both
Albert and Carole but not Bob or Donald, since Albert and Carole are involved in an odd
defeat cycle. So this yields that 10 is ultimately undefeated while 8 is defeated outright,
so we can believe Donald that the suspect did not hit the victim. Thus the justiﬁcation
status of Donald’s testimony depends on whether its attacker Albert is involved in an odd
or an even defeat cycle. Both Baroni and Giacomin (2005) and Pollock (2009) regard thisJanuary 3, 2012 15:17 Argument & Computation obituary6
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as counterintuitive.1
3.3. Argument strength
Although Pollock’s earliest system, from 1987, did not yet include a notion of strength,
Pollock later took the notion of strength of arguments very seriously. Since his system
was meant for epistemic reasoning, he always formulated strength in terms of numerical
degrees of belief. He was interested in computing the degree of justiﬁcation of a statement
P, that is, the degree of belief in P that an agent rationally ought to have. His approach
here was non-standard. Against Bayesian approaches, he argued that degrees of belief
and justiﬁcation do not conform to the laws of probability theory. One argument he gave
for this is that according to probability theory necessary truths have probability 1, but if
this is a degree of justiﬁcation, then we would be equally justiﬁed in believing Fermat’s
conjecture before and after Andrew Wiles proved it.
In his (1994, 1995), Pollock used a weakest-link approach to compute the strength of
arguments: the strength of each conclusion is the minimum of the strengths of the in-
ference with which it was derived and of the premises or intermediate conclusions from
which it was derived. While thus arguments can have various strengths, defeat is still
an all-or-nothing matter in that defeaters that are weaker than their target cannot affect
the status of their target at all. In consequence, the justiﬁcation status of a proposition
for which arguments can be constructed is three-valued: arguments can be ultimately de-
feated, ultimately undefeated or provisionally defeated. However, in his (2002, 2007a,
2010) Pollock explored the idea that weaker defeaters can still weaken the justiﬁcation
status of their stronger targets. To formalize this, he now made the justiﬁcation status of
statements a matter of numerical degree, being a function of the strengths of both support-
ing and defeating arguments. In fact, Pollock seemed not fully sure that his 2002 account
was the right one, witness the following quote:
In my (1995) I extended the above semantics to deal with reason strengths, but I am now
convinced that the (1995) proposal was not correct. I tried again in my (2002), and that
semantics or a minor variation of it may be correct, but I have not yet implemented it in
OSCAR. (Pollock 2007b, p. 459)
Nevertheless, the basic idea that epistemic beliefs can be justiﬁed in varying degrees is
very natural, and Pollock was right that the relations between defeasible reasoning and
differing degrees of belief deserves more attention than it receives. His own proposal
provides a good basis for further work on this topic.
3.4. Defeasible reasons and argumentation schemes
An important distinguishing feature of Pollock’s account of defeasible inference rules is
that he meant them to be general patterns of reasoning. While in AI there is a tradition
to let defeasible inference rules express domain-speciﬁc information, as in, for example,
default logic Reiter (1980), Pollock’s defeasible reasons are general patterns of epistemic
defeasible reasoning. In particular, he formalized reasons for perception, memory, induc-
tion, temporal persistence and the statistical syllogism, as well as undercutters for these
reasons. Here is how he contrasted his work with default logic:
In spirit, the theory of defeasible reasoning seems close to Reiter’s default logic [34], with
prima facie reasons and defeaters corresponding to Reiter’s defaults. But there are also pro-
found differences between the two theories. First, prima facie reasons are supposed to be
1Against this this, Bench-Capon, personal communication, has argued that odd and even defeat cycles are logically differ-
ent. According to him, odd defeat cycles are paradoxes while even defeat cycles are dilemmas. If he is right, then a different
treatment of odd and even defeat cycles is justiﬁed and Pollock would not have needed to revise his (1994,1995) semantics.January 3, 2012 15:17 Argument & Computation obituary6
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logical relationships between concepts. It is a necessary feature of the concept red that some-
thing’s looking red to me gives me a prima facie reason for thinking it is red. (To suppose
we have to discover such connections inductively leads to an inﬁnite regress, because we
must rely upon perceptual judgments to collect the data for an inductive generalization.) By
contrast, Reiter’s defaults often represent contingent generalizations. If we know that most
birds can ﬂy, then the inference from being a bird to ﬂying may be adopted as a default. In
the theory of defeasible reasoning, the latter inference is instead handled in terms of the fol-
lowing prima facie reason schema: Most A’s are B’s, and this is an A is a prima facie reason
for B ::: This is the statistical syllogism ::: (Pollock 1992, p. 9).
There is an interesting connection here with the literature of argumentation schemes
(Walton et al. 2008). Argumentation schemes are stereotypical non-deductive patterns of
reasoning. Their use in building arguments is evaluated in terms of critical questions spe-
ciﬁc to a scheme. In the literature on argumentation theory many collections of argu-
mentation schemes have been proposed, both for epistemic and for practical reasoning.
Pollock’s defeasible inference rules can in fact be seen as formalizations of some epis-
temic argumentation schemes. This also suggests a way to formalize reasoning with ar-
gumentation schemes (Prakken 2010): they can be seen as defeasible inference rules and
criticalquestionscanberegarded aspointerstocounterarguments.Somecriticalquestions
challenge an argument’s premise and therefore point to premise attacks, others point to
undercutting attacks, while again other questions point to rebutting attacks. Pollock’s em-
phasis on the general nature of defeasible reasons plus his distinction between rebutting
and undercutting defeat provided a basis for a formal framework for modeling reasoning
with argumentation schemes; the ASPIC framework as presented in Prakken (2010) adds
premise attack to Pollock’s rebutting and undercutting attack and thus arguably provides
a full framework for modelling reasoning with argumentation schemes.
3.5. Suppositional reasoning
In his earlier work Pollock extended his system with suppositional reasoning, by allowing
sets of assumptions to be introduced into and retracted from lines of argument just as
in natural deduction. This validates, for example, a defeasible derivation of the material
implication p  q from the fact that p a defeasible reason for q. In fact, this feature of his
system was not been taken up by others and Pollock himself did not use it any more in his
later work.
3.6. Partial computation
Pollock also addressed the issue of partial computation. To deal with the intractability of
the full version of his system, he suggested several alternative notions of defeat status,
all making his system nonmonotonic not just in the set of input beliefs but also in the
amount of computation. One of these notions, “justiﬁcation”, simply computes defeat sta-
tus relative to the inference graph computed at a certain moment. Pollock also developed
an alternative notion of adequacy of algorithms for defeasible reasoning, given that to be
tractable they cannot be sound and complete with respect to the ideal, that is, with respect
to the set of all arguments that can be computed. For the details we refer the reader to
(Pollock 1995, Ch. 4).
4. A critique of current computational models of argument in light of Pollock’s work
Much current formal and computational work on argumentation is on abstract argumen-
tation, as introduced by Dung (1995). However, to be useful and realistic, abstract modelsJanuary 3, 2012 15:17 Argument & Computation obituary6
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must be combined with accounts of the structure of arguments and the nature of attack
and defeat. While this should be obvious, it is less obvious what such accounts should be.
While almost all early work on argumentation in AI made a distinction between deduc-
tive (or ‘strict’) and defeasible inference rules, currently there is a growing body of work
that models argumentation as inconsistency handling in classical, or more generally de-
ductive logic. In the present section we shall argue that Pollock’s work strongly suggests
that deductive argumentation is of limited applicability and that many, if not most forms
of argumentation can only be naturally modeled by combining deductive and defeasible
inference rules.
As we have seen above, Pollock strongly emphasized the importance of defeasible rea-
sons in argumentation. According to him any full theory of argumentation should give
an account of the interplay between deductive and defeasible reasons. In the 1980’s and
early 1990’s this view was quite in agreement with most then current research on non-
monotonic logic.1 Default logic (Reiter 1980), one of the most inﬂuential nonmonotonic
logics at that time, added defeasible inference rules to the proof theory of classical logic.
Several systems for inheritance with exceptions (Horty and Thomason 1988) combined
strict and defeasible inheritance rules. In 1992, Simari and Loui fully formalized Loui
(1987)’s initial ideas on argumentation with strict and defeasible inference rules (Simari
and Loui 1992). This work in turn led to the development of Defeasible Logic Program-
ming (Garcia and Simari 2004). Lin and Shoham (1989) proposed the idea of abstract
argumentation structures with strict and defeasible rules and showed how a number of ex-
isting nonmonotonic logics could be reconstructed as such structures. Gerard Vreeswijk
further developed these ideas in his abstract argumentation systems (Vreeswijk 1997).
In 1994 Nute published the ﬁrst version of Defeasible Logic, which also combines strict
and defeasible domain-speciﬁc inference rules (Nute 1994). Finally, Prakken and Sartor
(1997) formalized an argumentation logic with strict and defeasible inference rules and
defeasible priorities explicitly as an instance of Dung (1995)’s abstract argumentation
frameworks. Currently, the proponents of the ASPIC framework (Modgil and Prakken
2011, Prakken 2010) try to unify and further develop this work into a general framework
for structured argumentation with both strict and defeasible inference rules.
Nowadays, however, there is a growing body of work that models argumentation as
inconsistency handling in either classical logic or some other standard deductive logic
(Amgoud and Besnard 2009, Amgoud and Cayrol 2002, Besnard and Hunter 2001, 2008,
Gorogiannis and Hunter 2011, Parsons et al. 2003). In Pollock’s terms, this work regards
all reasons as deductive. Accordingly, arguments can in these approaches only be attacked
on their premises. If such a reduction is possible then there is no need for new logics but
just for a proper way of modeling inconsistency handling in deductive logic, which, so it
is said, has the advantage that it is well-understood (Besnard and Hunter 2008, p. 16).
Pollock did not include premise attack in his work, since he was only interested in
what can be defeasibly inferred from a consistent body of information. When arguments
are constructed with defeasible reasons, they can be attacked even if all their premises
are accepted, since the premises only presumptively support their conclusion: it is ratio-
nally possible to at accept all premises of a defeasible inference but still not accept its
conclusion (at least if there are good reasons for not accepting it). Here the philosophi-
cal distinction between plausible and defeasible reasoning is relevant; see Rescher (1976,
1977) and Vreeswijk (1993, Ch. 8). Following Rescher, Vreeswijk describes plausible
reasoning as valid deductive reasoning from an uncertain basis, and defeasible reason-
ing as deductively invalid (but still rational) reasoning from a solid basis. In these terms,
models of deductive argumentation formalize plausible reasoning, while Pollock modeled
1Although Pollock’s study of reasons as general patterns of reasoning sets him apart from most other work in this vein,
which often uses defeasible reasons for expressing domain-speciﬁc regularities.January 3, 2012 15:17 Argument & Computation obituary6
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defeasible reasoning. The question then becomes: can defeasible reasoning be reduced to
plausible reasoning?
This question is not new. The current attempts to model argumentation on the basis
of ordinary deductive logic have their parallel in the history of nonmonotonic logic, in
which there have been several attempts to reduce nonmonotonic reasoning to some kind
of inconsistency handling in classical logic; see, for example, Baker and Ginsberg (1989),
Brewka (1989), Israel (1980), Poole (1988).1
Now whether such a reduction is possible or not, it should at least be clear that it is a
somewhat unnatural way to model defeasible reasoning, since the very idea of defeasible
inference rules is that it is rationally possible to accept all their premises but still deny
their conclusion. Consider the following well-known example: it is given that Quakers
are normally paciﬁsts, that Republicans are normally not paciﬁsts and that Nixon was
both a Quaker and a Republican. There is nothing inconsistent in these givens—indeed,
it is natural to think that they are all true. The reason is that “If P then normally Q”
and “P,” taken together, do not deductively imply “Q,” since things could be abnormal:
Nixon could be an abnormal Quaker or, an abnormal Republican. A defeasible reasoner
thereforedoesnothavetorejectanyofthegivens.Insteadsuchareasonerwantstoassume
whenever possible that things are normal, in order to jump to conclusions about Nixon in
the absence of evidence to the contrary.
Typical reductions of defeasible reasoning to inconsistency handling express such de-
fault assumptions as additional premises with a lower status than the rest of a knowledge
base, and model attacks on a defeasible inference as an attack on such premises. How-
ever, these approaches have been criticized for producing counterintuitive results due to
the use of the material implication, which is claimed to be logically too strong for repre-
senting defeasible conditionals; see, for example, (Brewka 1991, Ginsberg 1994). While
a review of this discussion goes beyond the scope of this paper (see for more details
Prakken (2012)), we can at least conclude from the existence of this debate—together
with the vast body of work on defeasible reasons in philosophy, nonmonotonic logic, and
argumentation theory—that the study of defeasible reasons deserves a central place in the
formal and computational study of argumentation. One of Pollock’s main contributions to
our ﬁeld is the ﬁrst formal account of defeasible reasons that is both technically mature
and philosophically grounded. What he did not address, however, was the integration of
defeasible with plausible reasoning, since he left no room for premise attack. Such an in-
tegration is one aim of the current ASPIC framework (Modgil and Prakken 2011, Prakken
2010), which combines Pollock’s work on defeasible reasons with the more recent work
on deductive argumentation.
5. Working style
We next give some brief observations on Pollock’s way of working and thinking.
A remarkable aspect of Pollock’s work, especially given that he was a philosopher, is
that he always implemented his theories of defeasible reasoning. Moreover, while most
AI researchers have teams of graduate students to do their coding, Pollock mostly wrote
his own code, in Common Lisp.
It is sometimes said that Pollock’s formalism for defeasible reasoning is too complex,
but we do not think that this criticism is entirely fair. The main reason for the complexity
of Pollock’s work is that his primary aim was not to design elegant and simple formalisms
but to formalize defeasible reasoning in its full complexity. Therefore, the option to over-
1Assumption-based argumentation (Bondarenko et al. 1997, Dung et al. 2009) is a special case; on the one hand it only
allows for premise attack, on the other hand it does not commit to classical or deductive logic as the source of its inference
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simplify formalisms just to be understood or to score theorems was not open to him.
Moreover, as discussed above, several relations have been established between his work
and Dung (1995)’s inﬂuential work on abstract argumentation, so that the place of his
formalisms in the spectrum of argumentation approaches is now quite well understood.
However, an admirable aspect of his writings is that Pollock was always exceptionally
clear and explicit about the reasons for and against his design choices. This relates to
an equally admirable aspect of his thinking, namely, his willingness to keep re-thinking
and re-thinking his approach to defeasible reasoning. When he saw what he recognized
as an error, Pollock was always willing to re-think even the most fundamental aspects of
his existing theories. This is, for example, true for his ﬁnal paper Pollock (2010), where
he rejected his (1994,1995) semantics and proposed an alternative. It is hard not to ad-
mire his intellectual honesty, and his willingness, even at this late stage, to reformulate
fundamental ideas in the face of a perceived difﬁculty.
6. A summary and evaluation of Pollock’s contributions to the ﬁeld of computational
argument
In sum, Pollock’s main contributions to the formal and computational study of argument
are as follows.
 He proposed one of the ﬁrst nonmonotonic logics with explicit notions of argument and
defeat.
 He introduced the important and now familiar distinction between rebutting and under-
cutting defeat.
 He was the ﬁrst in AI to regard defeasible reasons as general principles of reasoning.
He thus grounded his formalism in his work on epistemology and laid the basis for
formalizing argumentation schemes.
 The grounding of his theory in his work on epistemology allowed him to show that a
full model of reasoning must include defeasible reasons and that defeasible reasoning
cannot in general be reduced to inconsistency handling in deductive logic.
 He was the ﬁrst to use a labeling approach in the semantics of argumentation (although
derived directly from Doyle (1979)).
 He took self-defeating arguments more seriously than anyone else, showing that they
cannot simply be ruled out by deﬁnition but that some self-defeating arguments can
still prevent other arguments from being justiﬁed.
 He took argument strength seriously and raised the issue of modelling degrees of justi-
ﬁcation.
His work also has some limitations.
 Some aspects of his work have not have not survived, such as his work on suppositional
reasoning and on resource-bounded reasoning.
 While Pollock took argument strength seriously, he did not explicitly distinguish be-
tween attack and defeat, which sometimes leads to confusion (this matter is fully dis-
cussed in Horty (2012)). Currently there is a trend to clearly separate attack and de-
feat, e.g. Amgoud and Vesic (2011), Bench-Capon (2003), Modgil and Prakken (2011),
Prakken (2010), which, among other things allows for clean explicit modellings of ar-
guments about relative argument strength (Modgil 2009).
 In his work on argumentation Pollock only modelled epistemic reasoning. He fully
ignored normative reasoning and modelled practical reasoning (in his words “ratio-
nal decision making and practical cognition (including decision-theoretic planning)”)1
1http://oscarhome.soc-sci.arizona.edu/ftp/publications.html, accessed on November 28, 2011.January 3, 2012 15:17 Argument & Computation obituary6
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withoutargumentationconcepts(e.g.Pollock(1998,1999,2005)).Thismakeshiswork
less relevant for current argumentation models of practical reasoning, which is an im-
portant current theme in our ﬁeld. Among other things, he gave no argumentation-based
account of how practical reasoning depends on epistemic reasoning. Also, his work on
argument strength is only relevant for epistemic reasoning.
 A related limitation is that since Pollock was focused on probabilistic strength of epis-
temic arguments, he always assumed that defeasible reasons can be arranged in a linear
order of strength, and never thought of incomparable strengths or about defeasible rea-
soning about the strength of defeasible arguments.
In conclusion we can say that, above all, Pollock deserves to be remembered as one
of the founding fathers of our ﬁeld. Moreover, despite some limitations and imperfec-
tions, his work has historically been very inﬂuential while it still contains some important
lessons for current research. Most importantly, Pollock’s work reminds us of the richness
of our object of study, sometimes ignored in current work on, for example, abstract or
deductive argumentation.
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